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Abstract
We study the secure lossy transmission of a vector Gaussian source to a legiti-
mate user in the presence of an eavesdropper, where both the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper have vector Gaussian side information. The aim of the transmitter is
to describe the source to the legitimate user in a way that the legitimate user can
reconstruct the source within a certain distortion level while the eavesdropper is kept
ignorant of the source as much as possible as measured by the equivocation. We ob-
tain an outer bound for the rate, equivocation and distortion region of this secure lossy
transmission problem. This outer bound is tight when the transmission rate constraint
is removed. In other words, we obtain the maximum equivocation at the eavesdrop-
per when the legitimate user needs to reconstruct the source within a fixed distortion
level while there is no constraint on the transmission rate. This characterization of the
maximum equivocation involves two auxiliary random variables. We show that a non-
trivial selection for both random variables may be necessary in general. The necessity
of two auxiliary random variables also implies that, in general, Wyner-Ziv coding is
suboptimal in the presence of an eavesdropper. In addition, we show that, even when
there is no rate constraint on the legitimate link, uncoded transmission (deterministic
or stochastic) is suboptimal; the presence of an eavesdropper necessitates the use of a
coded scheme to attain the maximum equivocation.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 07-29127, CNS 09-64632, CCF 09-64645 and CCF 10-
18185.
1
1 Introduction
Information theoretic secrecy was initiated by Wyner in [1], where he studied the secure
lossless transmission of a source over a degraded wiretap channel, and obtained the necessary
and sufficient conditions. Later, his result was generalized to arbitrary, i.e., not necessarily
degraded, wiretap channels in [2]. In recent years, information theoretic secrecy has gathered
a renewed interest, where mostly channel coding aspects of secure transmission is considered,
in other words, secure transmission of uniformly distributed messages is studied.
Secure source coding problem has been studied for both lossless and lossy reconstruction
cases in [3–16]. Secure lossless source coding problem is studied in [3–9]. The common theme
of these works is that the legitimate receiver wants to reconstruct the source in a lossless
fashion by using the information it gets from the transmitter in conjunction with its side
information, while the eavesdropper is being kept ignorant of the source as much as possible.
Secure lossy source coding problem is studied in [10–16]. In these works, unlike the ones
focusing on secure lossless source coding, the legitimate receiver does not want to reconstruct
the source in a lossless fashion, but within a distortion level.
The most relevant works to our work here are [15,16]. In [15], the author considers the se-
cure lossy transmission of a source over a degraded wiretap channel while both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper have side information about the source. In [15], in addition
to the degradedness that the wiretap channel exhibits, the source and side information also
have a degradedness structure such that given the legitimate user’s side information, the
source and the eavesdropper’s side information are independent. For this setting, in [15], a
single-letter characterization of the distortion and equivocation region is provided. In par-
ticular, the optimality of a separation-based approach, i.e., the optimality of a code that
concatenates a rate-distortion code and a wiretap channel code, is shown. In [16], the set-
ting of [15] is partially generalized such that in [16], the source and side information do
not have any degradedness structure. On the other hand, as opposed to the noisy wiretap
channel of [15], in [16], the channel between the transmitter and receivers is assumed to be
noiseless. For this setting, in [16], a single-letter characterization of the rate, equivocation,
and distortion region is provided.
Here, we consider the setting of [16] for jointly Gaussian source and side information. In
particular, we consider the model where the transmitter has a vector Gaussian source which
is jointly Gaussian with the vector Gaussian side information of both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper. In this model, the transmitter wants to convey information to the
legitimate user in a way that the legitimate user can reconstruct the source within a distor-
tion level while the eavesdropper is being kept ignorant of the source as much as possible
as measured by the equivocation. A single-letter characterization of the rate, equivocation,
and distortion region for this setting exists due to [16]. Although we are unable to evaluate
this single-letter characterization for the vector Gaussian source and side information case to
obtain the corresponding rate, equivocation, distortion region explicitly, we obtain an outer
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bound for this region. We obtain this outer bound by optimizing the rate and equivocation
constraints separately. We note that a joint optimization of the rate and equivocation con-
straints for a fixed distortion level would yield the exact achievable rate and equivocation
region for this fixed distortion level. Thus, optimizing the rate and equivocation constraints
separately yields a larger region, i.e., an outer bound. We show that this outer bound is
tight when we remove the rate constraint at the transmitter. In other words, we obtain the
maximum achievable equivocation at the eavesdropper when the legitimate user needs to
reconstruct the vector Gaussian source within a fixed distortion while there is no constraint
on the transmission rate.
We note some implications of this result. First, we note that since there is no rate
constraint on the transmitter, it can use an uncoded scheme to describe the source to the
legitimate user, and, indeed, it can use any instantaneous (deterministic or stochastic) en-
coding scheme for this purpose. However, we show through an example that even when
there is no rate constraint on the transmitter, to attain the maximum equivocation at the
eavesdropper, in general, the transmitter needs to use a coded scheme. Hence, the presence
of an eavesdropper necessitates the use of a coded scheme even in the absence of a rate
constraint on the transmitter. Second, we note that the maximum equivocation expression
has two different covariance matrices originating from the presence of two auxiliary random
variables in the single-letter expression. We show through another example that both of
these covariance matrices, in other words, both of these two auxiliary random variables, are
needed in general to attain the maximum equivocation at the eavesdropper. The necessity of
two covariance matrices, and hence two auxiliary random variables, implies that, in general,
Wyner-Ziv coding scheme [17] is not sufficient to attain the maximum equivocation at the
eavesdropper.
2 Secure Lossy Source Coding
Here, we describe the secure lossy source coding problem and state the existing results. Let
{(Xi, Yi, Zi)}
n
i=1 denote i.i.d. tuples drawn from a distribution p(x, y, z). The transmitter,
the legitimate user and the eavesdropper observe Xn ∈ X n, Y n ∈ Yn, and Zn ∈ Zn, respec-
tively. The transmitter wants to convey information to the legitimate user in a way that
the legitimate user can reconstruct the source Xn within a certain distortion, and mean-
while the eavesdropper is kept ignorant of the source Xn as much as possible as measured
by the equivocation. We note that if there was no eavesdropper, this setting would reduce
to the Wyner-Ziv problem [17], for which a single-letter characterization for the minimum
transmission rate of the transmitter for each distortion level exists.
The distortion of the reconstructed sequence at the legitimate user is measured by the
function dn(Xn, Xˆn) where Xˆn ∈ Xˆ n denotes the legitimate user’s reconstruction of the
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source Xn. We consider the function dn(Xn, Xˆn) that has the following form
dn(Xn, Xˆn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, Xˆi) (1)
where d(a, b) is a non-negative finite-valued function. The confusion of the eavesdropper is
measured by the following equivocation term
1
n
H(Xn|Zn,M) (2)
where M ∈ M, which is a function of the source Xn, denotes the signal sent by the trans-
mitter.
An (n,R) code for secure lossy source coding consists of an encoding function fn : X
n →
M = {1, . . . , 2nR} at the transmitter and a decoding function at the legitimate user gn :
M×Yn → Xˆ n. A rate, equivocation and distortion tuple (R,Re, D) is achievable if there
exists an (n,R) code satisfying
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Xn|Zn,M) ≥ Re (3)
lim
n→∞
E[d(Xn, Xˆn)] ≤ D (4)
The set of all achievable (R,Re, D) tuples is denoted by R
∗ which is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 ([16, Theorem 1]) (R,Re, D) ∈ R
∗ iff
R ≥ I(V ;X|Y ) (5)
Re ≤ H(X|V, Y ) + I(X ; Y |U)− I(X ;Z|U) (6)
D ≥ E[d(X, Xˆ(V, Y ))] (7)
for some U, V satisfying the following Markov chain
U → V → X → Y, Z (8)
and a function Xˆ(V, Y ).
The achievable scheme that attains the region R∗ has the same spirit as the Wyner-Ziv
scheme [17] in the sense that both achievable schemes use binning to exploit the side informa-
tion at the legitimate user, and consequently, to reduce the rate requirement. The difference
of the achievable scheme that attains R∗ comes from the additional binning necessitated by
the presence of an eavesdropper. In particular, the transmitter generates sequences (Un, V n)
and bins both sequences. The transmitter sends these two bin indices. Using these bin in-
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dices, the legitimate user identifies the right (Un, V n) sequences, and reconstructs Xn within
the required distortion. On the other hand, using the bin indices of (Un, V n), the eaves-
dropper identifies only the right Un sequence, and consequently, U does not contribute to
the equivocation, see (6)1. Indeed, this achievable scheme can be viewed as if it is using a
rate-splitting technique to send the message M , since M has two coordinates, one for the
bin index of Un, and one for the bin index of V n. This perspective reveals the similarity of
the achievable scheme that attains R∗ and the one that attains the capacity-equivocation
region of the wiretap channel [2] where also rate-splitting is used. In particular, in the latter
case, the message W is divided into two partsWne,We such that Wne is sent by the sequence
Un and We is sent by the sequence V
n. The eavesdropper decodes Wne whereas the other
message We contributes to the secrecy.
We note that Theorem 1 holds for continuous (Xn, Y n, Zn) by replacing the discrete
entropy term H(X|V, Y ) with the differential entropy term h(X|V, Y ). To avoid the neg-
ative equivocation that might arise because of the use of differential entropy, we replace
equivocation with the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper Ie defined by
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Zn,M) (9)
Once we are interested in the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper, a rate, mutual
information leakage, and distortion (R, Ie, D) tuple is said to be achievable if there exists an
(n,R) code such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Zn,M) ≤ Ie (10)
lim
n→∞
E[d(Xn, Xˆn)] ≤ D (11)
The set of all achievable (R, Ie, D) tuples is denoted by R. Using Theorem 1, the region R
can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2 ([16]) (R, Ie, D) ∈ R iff
R ≥ I(V ;X|Y ) (12)
Ie ≥ I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U) (13)
D ≥ E[d(X, Xˆ(V, Y ))] (14)
for some U, V satisfying the following Markov chain
U → V → X → Y, Z (15)
1The fact that the eavesdropper can decode Un sequence can be obtained by observing that for a (U, V )
selection, if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z), there is no loss of optimality of setting U = φ which will yield a larger region.
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and a function Xˆ(V, Y ).
3 Vector Gaussian Sources
Now we study the secure lossy source coding problem for jointly Gaussian {(Xi,Yi,Zi)}
n
i=1
where the tuples {(Xi,Yi,Zi)}
n
i=1 are independent across time, i.e., across the index i, and
each tuple is drawn from the same jointly Gaussian distribution p(X,Y,Z). In other words,
we consider the case where Xi is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
KX ≻ 0, and the side information at the legitimate user Yi and the eavesdropper Zi are
jointly Gaussian with the source Xi. In particular, we assume that Yi,Zi have the following
form
Yi = Xi +NY,i (16)
Zi = Xi +NZ,i (17)
where NY,i and NZ,i are independent zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance
matrices ΣY ≻ 0 and ΣZ ≻ 0, respectively, and (NY,i,NZ,i) and Xi are independent. We
note that the side information given by (16)-(17) are not in the most general form. In the
most general case, we have
Yi = HYXi +NY,i (18)
Zi = HZXi +NZ,i (19)
for someHY ,HZ matrices. However, until Section 5, we consider the form of side information
given by (16)-(17), and obtain our results for this model. In Section 5, we generalize our
results to the most general case given by (18)-(19). We note that since the rate, information
leakage and distortion region is invariant with respect to the correlation between NY,i and
NZ,i, the correlation between NY,i and NZ,i is immaterial.
The distortion of the reconstructed sequence {Xˆi}
n
i=1 is measured by the mean square
error matrix:
E
[(
Xi − Xˆi
)(
Xi − Xˆi
)⊤]
(20)
Hence, the distortion constraint is represented by a positive semi-definite matrix D, which
is achievable if there is an (n,R) code such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[(
Xi − Xˆi
)(
Xi − Xˆi
)⊤]
 D (21)
Throughout the paper, we assume that 0  D  KX|Y . Since the mean square error is
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minimized by the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator which is given by the
conditional mean, we assume that the legitimate user applies this optimal estimator, i.e.,
the legitimate user selects its reconstruction function {Xˆi}
n
i=1 as
Xˆi = E [Xi|Y
n, fn(X
n)] (22)
Once the estimator of the legitimate user is set as (22), using Theorem 2, a single-letter
description of the region R for a vector Gaussian source can be given as follows.
Theorem 3 (R, Ie,D) ∈ R iff
R ≥ I(V ;X|Y) (23)
Ie ≥ I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U) (24)
D  KX|V Y (25)
for some U, V satisfying the following Markov chain
U → V → X→ Y,Z (26)
We also define the region R(D) as the union of the (R, Ie) pairs that are achievable when the
distortion constraint matrix is set to D. Our main result is an outer bound for the region
R(D), hence for the region R.
Theorem 4 When D  KX|Y , we have
R(D) ⊆ Ro(D) (27)
where Ro(D) is given by the union of (R, Ie) that satisfy
R ≥
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|D|
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|F(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX +ΣY |
|F(D) +ΣY |
(28)
Ie ≥ min
0KX|V KX|UKX
KX|V F(D)
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣY |
|KX|V +ΣY |
+
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(29)
and F(D) = ΣY (ΣY −D)
−1ΣY −ΣY .
We will prove Theorem 4 in Section 4. In the remainder of this section, we provide interpre-
tations and discuss some implications of Theorem 4.
The outer bound in Theorem 4 is obtained by minimizing the constraints on R and Ie
individually, i.e., the rate lower bound in (28) is obtained by minimizing the rate constraint
in (23) and the mutual information leakage lower bound in (29) is obtained by minimizing
the mutual information leakage constraint in (24) separately. However, to characterize the
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rate and mutual information leakage region R(D), one needs to minimize the rate constraint
in (23) and the mutual leakage information constraint in (24) jointly, not separately. In
particular, since the region R(D) is convex in the pairs (R, Ie) as per a time-sharing argu-
ment, joint optimization of the rate constraint in (23) and the mutual information leakage
constraint in (24) can be carried out by considering the tangent lines to the region R(D),
i.e., by solving the following optimization problem
L(µ1, µ2) = min
(R,Ie)∈R(D)
µ1R + µ2Ie (30)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
µ1 [I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y)] + µ2 [I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U)]
(31)
for all values of µ1, µ2, where µj ∈ [0,∞), j = 1, 2. As of now, we have been unable
to solve the optimization problem L(µ1, µ2) for all values of (µ1, µ2). However, as stated
in Theorem 4, we solve the optimization problems L(0, µ2) and L(µ1, 0) by showing the
optimality of jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) to evaluate the corresponding cost functions. In
other words, our outer bound in Theorem 4 can be written as follows.
R ≥ L(1, 0) (32)
Ie ≥ L(0, 1) (33)
We note that the constraint in (28), and hence L(1, 0), gives us the Wyner-Ziv rate distortion
function [17] for the vector Gaussian sources. Moreover, we note that L(0, 1) gives us the
minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate user wants to
reconstruct the source within a fixed distortion constraint D while there is no concern on the
transmission rate R. Denoting the minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper
when the legitimate user needs to reconstruct the source within a fixed distortion constraint
D by Imine (D), the corresponding result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 5 When D  KX|Y , we have
Imine (D) = min
0KX|VKX|UKX
KX|V F(D)
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣY |
|KX|V +ΣY |
+
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣZ|
|ΣZ|
(34)
where F(D) = ΣY (ΣY −D)
−1ΣY −ΣY .
Theorem 5 implies that if the transmitter’s aim is to minimize the mutual information
leakage to the eavesdropper without concerning itself with the rate it costs as long as the
legitimate receiver is able to reconstruct the source within a distortion constraint D, the use
of jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) is optimal. Since in Theorem 5, there is no rate constraint,
one natural question to ask is whether Imine (D) can be achieved by an uncoded transmission
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scheme. Now, we address this question in a broader context by letting the encoder use any
instantaneous encoding function in the form of gi(Xi) where gi(·) can be a deterministic or
a stochastic mapping. When gi(·) is chosen to be stochastic, we assume it to be independent
across time. We note that the uncoded transmission can be obtained from instantaneous
encoding by selecting gi(·) to be a linear function. Similarly, uncoded transmission with
artificial noise can be obtained from instantaneous encoding by selecting gi(x) = αx + N ,
where N denotes the noise. Hence, if the encoder uses an instantaneous encoding scheme,
the transmitted signal is given by M = [ g1(X1), . . . , gn(Xn) ]. Let I
ins
e (D) be the minimum
information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate user is able to reconstruct the
source with a distortion constraint D while the encoder uses an instantaneous encoding. The
following example demonstrates that, in general, Imine (D) cannot be achieved by instanta-
neous encoding.
Example 1 Consider the scalar case, where the side information at the legitimate user and
the eavesdropper are given as follows
Yi = Xi +Ny,i (35)
Zi = Xi +Nz,i (36)
where Xi, Ny,i and Nz,i are zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances σ
2
x, σ
2
y and
σ2z , respectively. {Xi}
n
i=1, {Ny,i}
n
i=1 and {Nz,i}
n
i=1 are independent. We assume that σ
2
y < σ
2
z ,
which implies that we can assume X → Y → Z since the scalar model in (35)-(36) is
statistically degraded, or in other words, the correlation between Ny,i and Nz,i does not affect
the achievable (R, Ie, D) region. Using Theorem 3, I
min
e (D) for the scalar Gaussian channel
under consideration can be found as follows
Imine (D) = min
U→V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y |U) + I(X ;Z|U) (37)
= min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y ) + I(X ;Z) (38)
where in (38), we used the Markov chain U → V → X → Y → Z.
As shown in Appendix A, the information leakage to the eavesdropper when the encoder
uses an instantaneous mapping is given by
I inse (D) = min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(X ;V, Z) (39)
= min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Z) + I(X ;Z) (40)
where (40) is obtained by using the Markov chain V → X → Z.
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Using (38) and (40), we have
I inse (D)− I
min
e (D) = min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Z) + I(X ;Z)
− min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y ) + I(X ;Z) (41)
≥ min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z) (42)
= min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ; Y |Z) (43)
where (43) comes from the Markov chain V → Y → Z. Next, we note the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For jointly Gaussian (X, Y, Z) satisfying the Markov chain X → Y → Z and
Pr[Y = Z] 6= 1, if D < σ2x|y, we have
min
V→X→Y→Z
σ2
x|vy
≤D
I(V ; Y |Z) > 0 (44)
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix B. The proof of Lemma 1 starts with the
observation that (44) is zero iff we have the Markov chain V → Z → Y . On the other hand,
since we already have the Markov chain V → X → Y → Z, and Y and Z are not identical,
we show in Appendix B that the Markov chain V → Z → Y is possible iff V and X are
independent. However, if D < σ2x|y, any V that is independent of X is not feasible. Hence,
Lemma 1 follows. Lemma 1 implies that in general, we have I inse (D) 6= I
min
e (D), i.e., I
min
e (D)
cannot be achieved by instantaneous encoding.
This example shows that an uncoded transmission is not optimal even when there is no rate
constraint. This is due to the presence of an eavesdropper; the presence of an eavesdropper
necessitates the use of a coded scheme.
Another question that Theorem 5 brings about is whether the minimum in (34) is achieved
by a non-trivial KX|U . By a trivial selection for KX|U we mean either KX|U = KX or
KX|U = KX|V . The former corresponds to the selection U = φ and the latter corresponds
to the selection U = V . We note that although (34) is monotonically decreasing in KX|V in
the positive semi-definite sense, (34) is neither monotonically increasing nor monotonically
decreasing inKX|U in the positive semi-definite sense. Hence, due to this lack of monotonicity
of (34) in KX|U , in general, we expect that both U 6= φ and U 6= V may be necessary to
attain the minimum in (34). The following example demonstrates that in general U 6= φ and
U 6= V may be necessary.
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Example 2 Consider the Gaussian source X = [ X1 X2 ]
⊤ where X1 and X2 are indepen-
dent. The side information at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
Yℓ = Xℓ +NY,ℓ, ℓ = 1, 2 (45)
Zℓ = Xℓ +NZ,ℓ, ℓ = 1, 2 (46)
where NY,ℓ and NZ,ℓ are zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances σ
2
Y,ℓ and σ
2
Z,ℓ,
respectively. Moreover, NY,1 and NY,2 are independent, and also so are NZ,1 and NZ,2. We
assume that noise variances satisfy
σ2Y,1 < σ
2
Z,1 (47)
σ2Z,2 < σ
2
Y,2 (48)
which, in view of the fact that correlation between the noise at the legitimate receiver and the
noise at the eavesdropper does not affect the rate, distortion and information leakage region,
lets us assume the following Markov chains
X1 → Y1 → Z1 (49)
X2 → Z2 → Y2 (50)
Moreover, we assume that the distortion constraint D is a diagonal matrix with diagonal
entries D1 and D2. In this case, the minimum information leakage is given by
Imine (D1, D2) = min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1)− I(V1; Y1) + I(X1;Z1)
+ min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2) + I(X2;Z2|V2) (51)
whose proof can be found in Appendix C. The minimum information leakage in (51) corre-
sponds the selections U = (φ, V2) and V = (V1, V2), where (U1, V1) and (U2, V2) are indepen-
dent. This selection of (U, V ) corresponds to neither U = φ nor U = V .
Next, we obtain the minimum information leakage that arises when we set either U = φ
or U = V , and show that the minimum information leakage arising from these selections
are strictly larger than the minimum information leakage in (51), which will imply the sub-
optimality of U = φ and U = V . When we set U = φ, the minimum information leakage is
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given by
Imin−φe (D1, D2) = min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1)− I(V1; Y1) + I(X1;Z1)
+ min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2)− I(V2; Y2) + I(X2;Z2) (52)
whose proof is given in Appendix D. When we set U = V , the minimum information leakage
is given by
Imin−Se (D1, D2) = min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1) + I(X1;Z1|V1)
+ min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2) + I(X2;Z2|V2) (53)
whose proof can be found in Appendix D.
Now, we compare the minimum information leakage in (51) with (52) and (53) to show
that the selections U = φ and U = V are sub-optimal in general. Using (51) and (52), we
get
Imin−φe (D1, D2)− I
min
e (D1, D2) = min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2)− I(V2; Y2) + I(X2;Z2)
− min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2) + I(X2;Z2|V2) (54)
≥ min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(X2;Z2)− I(X2;Z2|V2)− I(V2; Y2) (55)
= min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;Z2)− I(V2; Y2) (56)
= min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;Z2|Y2) (57)
> 0 (58)
where (56)-(57) follow from the Markov chain
V2 → X2 → Z2 → Y2 (59)
and (58) comes from Lemma 1. Thus, in general, we have Imin−φe (D1, D2) 6= I
min
e (D1, D2),
or in other words, in general, U = φ is sub-optimal.
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Next, we consider the selection U = V . Using (51) and (53), we have
Imin−Se (D1, D2)− I
min
e (D1, D2) = min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1) + I(X1;Z1|V1)
− min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1)− I(V1; Y1) + I(X1;Z1) (60)
≥ min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(X1;Z1|V1) + I(V1; Y1)− I(X1;Z1) (61)
= min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1; Y1)− I(V1;Z1) (62)
= min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1; Y1|Z1) (63)
> 0 (64)
where (62)-(63) follow from the Markov chain
V1 → X1 → Y1 → Z1 (65)
and (64) comes from Lemma 1. Thus, in general, we have Imin−Se (D1, D2) 6= I
min
e (D1, D2),
or in other words, in general, U = V is sub-optimal.
Example 2 shows that, in general, we might need two covariance matrices, and hence two
different auxiliary random variables, to attain the minimum information leakage. Indeed, if
we have either U = V or U = φ, the corresponding achievable scheme is identical to the
Wyner-Ziv scheme [17]. Hence, the necessity of two different auxiliary random variables
implies that, in general, Wyner-Ziv scheme [17] is suboptimal.
4 Proof of Theorem 4
We now provide the proof of Theorem 4. As mentioned in the previous section, this outer
bound is obtained by minimizing the rate constraint in (23) and the mutual information
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leakage constraint in (24) separately. We first consider the rate constraint in (23) as follows
R ≥ L(1, 0) (66)
= min
V→X→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X|Y) (67)
= min
V→X→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
h(X|Y)− h(X|V,Y) (68)
= min
V→X→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
1
2
log |(2πe)KX|Y | − h(X|V,Y) (69)
= min
KX|V Y D
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|KX|V Y |
(70)
=
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|D|
(71)
where (70) comes from the fact that h(X|V,Y) is maximized by jointly Gaussian (V,X,Y),
and (71) comes from the monotonicity of | · | in positive semi-definite matrices. Now we
introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|D|
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|F(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX +ΣY |
|F(D) +ΣY |
(72)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix E. Lemma 2 and (71) imply (28).
Next, we consider the mutual information leakage constraint in (24) as follows
Ie ≥ L(0, 1) = min
U→V→X→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U) (73)
We note that the cost function of L(0, 1) can be rewritten as follows
C(L) = I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y) + I(U ;Y) + I(X;Z|U) (74)
= I(V ;X|Y) + [I(U ;Y) + I(X;Z|U)] (75)
where (74) comes from the Markov chain U → V → Y and (75) comes from the Markov
chain V → X→ Y. We note that the first term in (75) is minimized by a jointly Gaussian
(V,X) as we already showed in obtaining the lower bound for the rate given by (28) above
in (66)-(71). On the other hand, the remaining term of (75) in the bracket is maximized by
a jointly Gaussian (U,X) as shown in [18]. Thus, a tension between these two terms arises
if (U, V,X) is selected to be jointly Gaussian. In spite of this tension, we will still show that
a jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) is the minimizer of L(0, 1). Instead of directly showing this,
we first characterize the minimum mutual information leakage when (U, V,X) is restricted
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to be jointly Gaussian, and show that this cannot be attained by any other distribution for
(U, V,X). We note that any jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) can be written as
V = AVX+NV (76)
U = AUX+NU (77)
where NV ,NU are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices ΣV ,ΣU ,
respectively. Moreover, NV ,NU are independent of X,Y,Z, but can be dependent on each
other. Before characterizing the minimum mutual information leakage when (U, V,X) is
restricted to be jointly Gaussian, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 3 When D  KX|Y and V is Gaussian, we have the following facts.
• ΣY −D ≻ 0, i.e., ΣY −D is positive definite, and hence, non-singular.
• We have the following equivalence:
KX|V Y  D ⇐⇒ KX|V  F(D) (78)
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix F. Using Lemma 3, the minimum mutual
information leakage to the eavesdropper when (U, V,X) is restricted to be jointly Gaussian
can be written as follows:
LG = min
U→V→X→Y,Z
(U,V,X) is jointly Gaussian
KX|VF(D)
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U) (79)
We note that the minimization in (79) can be written as a minimization of the cost function
in (79) over all possible AU ,AV ,ΣU ,ΣV matrices by expressing KX|U and KX|V in terms of
AU ,AV ,ΣU ,ΣV . Instead of considering this tedious optimization problem, we consider the
following one:
L¯G = min
0KX|VKX|UKX
KX|V F(D)
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣY |
|KX|V +ΣY |
+
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(80)
We note that due to the Markov chain U → V → X, we always have KX|V  KX|U . A
proof of this fact is given in Appendix G. Besides this inequality, KX|V and KX|U might
have further interdependencies which are not considered in the optimization problem in (80).
Since neglecting these further interdependencies among KX|U and KX|V enlarges the feasible
set of the optimization problem in (79), we have, in general,
LG ≥ L¯G (81)
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On the other hand, it can be shown that the value of L¯G can be obtained by some jointly
Gaussian (U, V,X) satisfying the Markov chain U → V → X, as stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4
LG = L¯G (82)
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix H.
Now we study the optimization problem L¯G in (80) in more detail. Let K∗X|V and K
∗
X|U
be the minimizers for the optimization problem L¯G. They need to satisfy the following KKT
conditions.
Lemma 5 If K∗X|V and K
∗
X|U are the minimizers for the optimization problem L¯
G, they need
to satisfy
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU +MD = (K
∗
X|V )
−1 (83)
(K∗X|U +ΣZ)
−1 +MX = (K
∗
X|U +ΣY )
−1 +MU (84)
MU(K
∗
X|U −K
∗
X|V ) = (K
∗
X|U −K
∗
X|V )MU = 0 (85)
MD(F(D)−K
∗
X|V ) = (F(D)−K
∗
X|V )MD = 0 (86)
MX(KX −K
∗
X|U) = (KX −K
∗
X|U)MX = 0 (87)
for some positive semi-definite matrices MU ,MD,MX .
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix I.
Next, we use channel enhancement [19]. In particular, we enhance the legitimate user’s
side information as follows.
(K∗X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1 = (K∗X|U +ΣY )
−1 +MU (88)
This new covariance matrix Σ˜Y has some useful properties which are listed in the following
lemma.
Lemma 6 We have the following facts.
• 0  Σ˜Y
• Σ˜Y  ΣY , Σ˜Y  ΣZ
• (K∗X|V + Σ˜Y )
−1 = (K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
• (K∗X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1(K∗X|V + Σ˜Y ) = (K
∗
X|U +ΣY )
−1(K∗X|V +ΣY )
• (K∗X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1(KX + Σ˜Y ) = (K
∗
X|U +ΣZ)
−1(KX +ΣZ)
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• (K∗X|V + Σ˜Y )
−1(F(D) + Σ˜Y ) = (K
∗
X|V )
−1F(D)
The proof of Lemma 6 is given in Appendix J. Using this new covariance Σ˜Y , we define the
enhanced side information at the legitimate user Y˜ as follows
Y˜ = X+ N˜Y (89)
where N˜Y is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix Σ˜Y . Since we
have Σ˜Y  ΣY and Σ˜Y  ΣZ as stated in the second statement of Lemma 6, without loss
of generality, we can assume that the following Markov chain exists.
X→ Y˜ → Y,Z (90)
Assuming that the Markov chain in (90) exists does not incur any loss of generality because
the rate, mutual information leakage and distortion region R depends only on the condi-
tional marginal distributions p(Y|X), p(Z|X) but not on the conditional joint distribution
p(Y,Z|X). Now, we define the following optimization problem:
L¯ = min
U→V→X→Y˜→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜|U) + I(X;Z|U) (91)
We note that we have I(V ;Y|U) ≤ I(V ; Y˜|U) due to the Markov chain in (90), which leads
to the following fact:
LG = L¯G ≥ L(0, 1) ≥ L¯ (92)
Moreover, unlike the original optimization problem L(0, 1) in (73), we can find the minimizer
of the new optimization problem L¯ explicitly, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 7
L¯ =
1
2
log
|KX |
|F(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX + Σ˜Y |
|F(D) + Σ˜Y |
+
1
2
log
|KX +ΣZ|
|ΣZ|
(93)
We note that Lemma 7 implies that U = φ and a Gaussian V leading to KX|V = F(D) is the
minimizer of the optimization problem L¯. The proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix K.
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Next, we show that indeed LG = L¯G = L¯ which, in view of (92), will imply L(0, 1) =
L¯ = L¯G = LG. To this end, using Lemma 7, we have
L¯ =
1
2
log
|KX |
|F(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX + Σ˜Y |
|F(D) + Σ˜Y |
+
1
2
log
|KX +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(94)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|K∗X|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX + Σ˜Y |
|K∗X|V + Σ˜Y |
+
1
2
log
|KX +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(95)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|K∗X|V |
−
1
2
log
|K∗X|U + Σ˜Y |
|K∗X|V + Σ˜Y |
+
1
2
log
|K∗X|U +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(96)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|K∗X|V |
−
1
2
log
|K∗X|U +ΣY |
|K∗X|V +ΣY |
+
1
2
log
|K∗X|U +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(97)
= L¯G = LG (98)
where (95) comes from the last statement of Lemma 6, (96) follows from the fifth statement
of Lemma 6, and (97) comes from the fourth statement of Lemma 6. In view of (92),
(98) implies that L(0, 1) = LG; completing the proof of Theorem 4 as well as the proof of
Theorem 5 due to the fact that Imine = L(0, 1).
5 General Case
We now consider the general case where the side information are given by
Y = HYX+NY (99)
Z = HZX+NZ (100)
where without loss of generality, we can assume that the covariance matrices of Gaussian vec-
tors NY and NZ are given by identity matrices. We denote the singular value decomposition
of HY and HZ by HY = QYΛYR
⊤
Y and HZ = QZΛZR
⊤
Z , respectively. Since any invertible
transformation applied to the side information does not change the rate, information leak-
age, and distortion region, the side information given by (99)-(100) and the side information
obtained by multiplying (99)-(100) by Q⊤Y ,Q
⊤
Z , respectively, yield the same rate, information
leakage and distortion region. In other words, the side information given by (99)-(100) and
the side information given by
Y¯ = ΛYR
⊤
YX+ N¯Y (101)
Z¯ = ΛZR
⊤
ZX+ N¯Z (102)
yield the same rate, information leakage and distortion region, where the covariance matrices
of N¯Y , N¯Z are given by identity matrices. Next, we claim that there is no loss of generality
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to assume that the side information Y¯ and Z¯ have the same length as the source X. To
this end, assume that the length of Y¯ is smaller than the length of X. In this case, simply,
we can concatenate Y¯ with some zero vector to ensure that both Y¯ and X have the same
length. Next, assume that the length of Y¯ is larger than the length of X. In this case, ΛY
will definitely have at least length(Y¯) − length(X) diagonal elements which are zero, and
hence the corresponding entries in Y¯ will come from only the noise. Since noise components
are independent, dropping these elements of Y¯ does not change the rate, information leakage
and distortion region. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that length(Y¯) =
length(X), and hence without loss of generality, we can assume that ΛY is a square matrix.
The same argument applies to the eavesdropper’s side information, and hence, without loss
of generality, we can also assume that ΛZ is a square matrix. Next, we define the following
side information
Y¯α = (ΛY + αI)R
⊤
YX+ N¯Y (103)
Z¯α = (ΛZ + αI)R
⊤
ZX+ N¯Z (104)
where α > 0. We note that (ΛY + αI) and (ΛY + αI) are invertible matrices. Since
multiplying the side information in (103)-(100) by some invertible matrices does not change
the rate, information leakage and distortion region, the side information in (103)-(104) and
the following side information
Y¯α = X+ N¯Y,α (105)
Z¯α = X+ N¯Z,α (106)
have the same rate, information leakage and distortion region, where the covariance matrices
of N¯Y,α and N¯Z,α are given by
ΣY,α = RY (ΛY + αI)
−2R⊤Y (107)
ΣZ,α = RZ(ΛZ + αI)
−2R⊤Z (108)
respectively. For a given distortion constraint D, we denote the rate and information leakage
region for the side information model given in (99)-(100) by Ro(D), where the subscript o
stands for the “original system”, and for the side information model given in (105)-(106) by
Rα(D). We have the following relationship between Ro(D) and Rα(D).
Lemma 8
Ro(D) ⊆ lim
α→0
Rα(D) (109)
The proof of Lemma 8 is given in Appendix L. Next, using Theorem 4, we obtain an outer
bound for the region limα→0Rα(D), where this outer bound also serves as an outer bound
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for the region Ro(D) due to Lemma 8. The corresponding result is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6 If D  KX|Y , any (R, Ie) ∈ Ro(D) satisfies
R ≥
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|D|
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|Fo(D)|
−
1
2
log
|HYKXH
⊤
Y + I|
|HYFo(D)H⊤Y + I|
(110)
Ie ≥ min
0KX|VKX|UKX
KX|VFo(D)
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|HYKX|UH
⊤
Y + I|
|HYKX|VH
⊤
Y + I|
+
1
2
log |HYKX|UH
⊤
Y + I|
(111)
where Fo(D) = (D
−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1.
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix M. We prove Theorem 6 in two steps. In
the first step, by using Theorem 4, we obtain an outer bound for the region Rα(D), and in
the second step, we obtain the limit of this outer bound as α → 0. As the outer bound in
Theorem 6 basically comes from the outer bound in Theorem 4, all our previous comments
and remarks about Theorem 4 are also valid for the outer bound in Theorem 6. Similar to
Theorem 4, Theorem 6 also provides the minimum information leakage to the eavesdrop-
per when the rate constraint on the transmitter is removed. Denoting the corresponding
minimum information leakage by Imine (D), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7 If D  KX|Y , we have
Imine (D) ≥ min
0KX|VKX|UKX
KX|V Fo(D)
1
2
log
|KX|
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|HYKX|UH
⊤
Y + I|
|HYKX|VH
⊤
Y + I|
+
1
2
log |HYKX|UH
⊤
Y + I|
(112)
where Fo(D) = (D
−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1.
As Theorem 7 basically comes from Theorem 5, all our previous comments and remarks
about Theorem 5 are also valid for Theorem 7.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study secure lossy source coding for vector Gaussian sources, where the
transmitter sends information about the source in a way that the legitimate user can re-
construct the source within a distortion level by using its side information. Meanwhile, the
transmitter wants to keep the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper to a minimum,
where the eavesdropper also has a side information about the source. We obtain an outer
bound for the achievable rate, mutual information leakage, and distortion region. Moreover,
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we obtain the minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate
user needs to reconstruct the source within a certain distortion while there is no constraint
on the transmission rate.
Appendices
A Proof of (39)
We first define the following function
R(D) = min
V→X→Y,Z
σ2
X|V Y
≤D
I(X ;V, Z) (113)
which is monotonically decreasing, continuous and convex in D. Next, we note that when an
instantaneous encoding scheme is used, the minimum-mean-square-error estimator is given
by
Xˆi = E [Xi|g1(X1), . . . , gn(Xn), Y
n] (114)
= E [Xi|gi(Xi), Yi] (115)
where (115) comes from the independence of (Xi, gi(Xi), Yi) across time. Consequently, when
an instantaneous encoding scheme is used, the minimum-mean-square-error is given by
σ2Xi|gi(Xi)Yi = E
[
(Xi − E [Xi|gi(Xi), Yi])
2] (116)
Assume that there exists an instantaneous encoding scheme that achieves the distortion level
D:
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ2Xi|gi(Xi)Yi ≤ D (117)
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We now obtain a lower bound for the minimum information leakage for this instantaneous
encoding scheme as follows
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;M,Zn) = lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn; g1(X1), . . . , gn(Xn), Z
n) (118)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; gi(Xi), Zi) (119)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi, Zi) (120)
≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
R
(
σ2Xi|ViYi
)
(121)
≥ lim
n→∞
R
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ2Xi|ViYi
)
(122)
= R
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ2Xi|ViYi
)
(123)
≥ R(D) (124)
where (119) comes from the independence of (Xi, gi(Xi), Zi) across time, (120) follows by
setting Vi = gi(Xi), (121) comes from the definition of R(D), (122) is due to the convexity
of R(D) in D, (123) follows from the fact that R(D) is continuous in D, and (124) comes
from (117) and the fact that R(D) is monotonically decreasing in D.
B Proof of Lemma 1
We first introduce two lemmas that will be used in the proof of Lemma 1. Throughout this
appendix, we use notation A ⊥⊥ B to denote “A and B are independent” to shorten the
presentation.
Lemma 9 Let Q, T,W be arbitrary random variables. If we have Q → T → T +W and
T ⊥⊥ W . Then, we have (Q, T ) ⊥⊥ W .
Proof: Since a set of random variables is independent iff their joint characteristic function
is the product of their individual characteristic functions, to prove Lemma 9, it is sufficient
to show the following.
E
[
es1Q+s2T+s3W
]
= E
[
es1Q+s2T
]
E
[
es3W
]
, ∀(s1, s2, s3) (125)
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We can show this as follows
E
[
es1Q+s2T+s3W
]
= E
[
E
[
es1Q+s2T+s3W
∣∣T ]] (126)
= E
[
e(s2−s3)T E
[
es1Q+s3(T+W )
∣∣T ]] (127)
= E
[
e(s2−s3)T E
[
es1Q
∣∣T ]E [es3(T+W )∣∣T ]] (128)
= E
[
es2T E
[
es1Q
∣∣T ]E [es3W ∣∣T ]] (129)
= E
[
es2T E
[
es1Q
∣∣T ]E [es3W ]] (130)
= E
[
es2T E
[
es1Q
∣∣T ]]E [es3W ] (131)
= E
[
es1Q+s2T
]
E
[
es3W
]
(132)
where (128) comes from the Markov chain Q→ T → T +W and (130) follows from the fact
that T ⊥⊥ W . Equation (132) implies the independence between (Q, T ) and W ; completing
the proof of Lemma 9. 
Lemma 10 Let Q, T,W be random variables satisfying (T,Q) ⊥⊥ W and Q ⊥⊥ T + W .
Then, we have Q ⊥⊥ T .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 9, here also we use the fact that a set of random
variables is independent iff their joint characteristic function is the product of their individual
characteristic functions. To this end, since (T,Q) ⊥⊥ W , we have
E
[
es1W+s2T+s3Q
]
= E
[
es1W
]
E
[
es2T+s3Q
]
, ∀(s1, s2, s3) (133)
If we set s1 = s2 in (133), we get
E
[
es2W+s2T+s3Q
]
= E
[
es2W
]
E
[
es2T+s3Q
]
, ∀(s2, s3) (134)
On the other hand, since Q ⊥⊥ T +W , we have
E
[
es2W+s2T+s3Q
]
= E
[
es2(W+T )
]
E
[
es3Q
]
(135)
= E
[
es2W
]
E
[
es2T
]
E
[
es3Q
]
(136)
where (136) comes from the fact that T ⊥⊥ W . In view of (134) and (136), we have
E
[
es2T+s3Q
]
= E
[
es2T
]
E
[
es3Q
]
(137)
which implies that T ⊥⊥ Q; completing the proof of Lemma 10. 
We now prove Lemma 1. We note that we have I(V ; Y |Z) = 0 iff the Markov chain
V → Z → Y holds. We prove by contradiction that when D < σ2x|y, the Markov chain V →
Z → Y is not possible. To this end, we note that the side information at the eavesdropper
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can be written as
Z = X +Ny + N˜z (138)
or in other words, we have Nz = Ny+N˜z where N˜z is a Gaussian random variable independent
of (X,Ny) with variance σ
2
z−σ
2
y > 0. Next, we note that the Markov chain V → X → Y → Z
implies (V,X) ⊥⊥ (Ny, N˜z) in view of Lemma 9. Since Y, Z are jointly Gaussian, Y can be
written as
Y = αZ + (Y − αZ) (139)
where α = E[Y Z]/E[Z2], and as a consequence of this α choice, we have Z ⊥⊥ Y − αZ.
Hence, if we have the Markov chain
V → Z → Y = αZ + (Y − αZ) (140)
then, Lemma 9 implies that V ⊥⊥ Y − αZ, where Y − αZ is
Y − αZ = (1− α)X + (1− α)Ny − N˜z (141)
Since (V,X) ⊥⊥ (Ny, N˜z), we have (V,X) ⊥⊥ (1−α)Ny − N˜z, and also V ⊥⊥ (1−α)X + (1−
α)Ny− N˜z due to the assumption that the Markov chain V → Z → Y holds. Hence, in view
of Lemma 10, we have V ⊥⊥ X . Moreover, since we have the Markov chain V → X → Y ,
V ⊥⊥ X implies that V ⊥⊥ (X, Y ). Hence, if V ⊥⊥ (X, Y ), we have σ2x|vy = σ
2
x|y. However,
if D < σ2x|y, V ⊥⊥ X is not feasible, and this implies that the Markov chain V → Z → Y is
not possible; completing the proof of Lemma 1.
C Proof of (51)
Here, we provide the proof of (51). To this end, we consider a slightly more general case
where the joint distribution of the source and side information is given by
p(x,y, z) =
L∏
i=1
p(xi, yi, zi) (142)
and the distortion constraint is imposed with a diagonal matrix D whose diagonal entries
are denoted by D1, . . . , DL. From Theorem 3, the minimum information leakage is given by
Imine = min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U) (143)
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We first introduce the following auxiliary random variables
Ui = UY
i−1ZLi+1, i = 1, . . . , L (144)
Vi = V Y
i−1XLi+1, i = 1, . . . , L (145)
which satisfy the Markov chain
Ui → Vi → Xi → Yi, Zi (146)
which follows from (142) and the Markov chain U → V → X→ Y,Z.
Next, we introduce the following two lemmas.
Lemma 11 ([2, Lemma 7]) Let Sn, T n be length-n random vectors, and W be an arbitrary
random variable. We have
n∑
i=1
I(T ni+1;Si|WS
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Si−1;Ti|WT
n
i+1) (147)
Using Lemma 11, the following lemma can be proved.
Lemma 12
I(W ;Sn)− I(W ;T n) =
n∑
i=1
I(W ;Si|S
i−1T ni+1)− I(W ;Ti|S
i−1T ni+1) (148)
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Now, we proceed with (143) as follows
Imine = min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U) (149)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y) + I(U ;Y)− I(U ;Z) + I(X;Z) (150)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(V ;Xi|Y
i−1, XLi+1)− I(V ; Yi|Y
i−1, XLi+1)
+
L∑
i=1
I(U ; Yi|Y
i−1, ZLi+1)− I(U ;Zi|Y
i−1, ZLi+1) + I(X;Z) (151)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(V ;Xi|Y
i−1, XLi+1)− I(V ; Yi|Y
i−1, XLi+1)
+
L∑
i=1
I(U ; Yi|Y
i−1, ZLi+1)− I(U ;Zi|Y
i−1, ZLi+1) + I(Xi;Zi) (152)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Y i−1, XLi+1, V ;Xi)− I(Y
i−1, XLi+1, V ; Yi)
+
L∑
i=1
I(Y i−1, ZLi+1, U ; Yi)− I(Y
i−1, ZLi+1, U ;Zi) + I(Xi;Zi) (153)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi)− I(Vi; Yi) + I(Ui; Yi)− I(Ui;Zi) + I(Xi;Zi) (154)
= min
U→V→X→Y,Z
σ2
Xi|V Y
L
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi)− I(Vi; Yi|Ui) + I(Xi;Zi|Ui) (155)
≥ min
Ui→Vi→Xi→Yi,Zi
σ2
Xi|ViYi
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi)− I(Vi; Yi|Ui) + I(Xi;Zi|Ui) (156)
where (150) comes from the Markov chain U → V → X → Y,Z, (151) follows from
Lemma 12, (152) and (153) are due to (142), (154) follows from the definitions of Ui, Vi in
(144) and (145), respectively, (155) comes from (146), and (156) follows from
σ2Xi|V Y L ≥ σ
2
Xi|V Y LXLi+1
(157)
= σ2Xi|V Y iXLi+1
(158)
= σ2Xi|ViYi (159)
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where (157) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE (which will be shown in
Appendix G), (158) comes from the following Markov chain
Xi, V, Y
i → XLi+1 → Y
L
i+1 (160)
which is a consequence of (142) and the Markov chain U → V → X → Y,Z, and (159)
is obtained by using the definition of Vi given in (145). Hence, (156) implies that when
the joint distribution of the source and side information can be factorized as in (142), the
minimum information leakage is given by
Imine = min
Ui→Vi→Xi→Yi,Zi
σ2
Xi|ViYi
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi)− I(Vi; Yi|Ui) + I(Xi;Zi|Ui) (161)
We now specialize (161) for the case given in Example 2, where L = 2 and we have the
following Markov chains
X1 → Y1 → Z1 (162)
X2 → Z2 → Y2 (163)
Under these conditions, the minimum information leakage is given by
Imine = min
U1→V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1)− I(V1; Y1|U1) + I(X1;Z1|U1)
+ min
U2→V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2)− I(V2; Y2|U2) + I(X2;Z2|U2) (164)
= min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1)− I(V1; Y1) + I(X1;Z1)
+ min
U2→V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2)− I(V2; Y2|U2) + I(X2;Z2|U2) (165)
= min
V1→X1→Y1→Z1
σ2
X1|V1Y1
≤D1
I(V1;X1)− I(V1; Y1) + I(X1;Z1)
+ min
V2→X2→Z2→Y2
σ2
X2|V2Y2
≤D2
I(V2;X2) + I(X2;Z2|V2) (166)
where (165)-(166) come from the following Markov chains
U1 → V1 → X1 → Y1 → Z1 (167)
U2 → V2 → X2 → Z2 → Y2 (168)
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respectively; completing the proof.
D Proofs of (52) and (53)
We first prove (52). To this end, we note that when the joint distribution of the source and
side information is given by
p(x,y, z) =
L∏
i=1
p(xi, yi, zi) (169)
and the distortion constraint is imposed by a diagonal matrix D with diagonal entries
D1, . . . , DL, the minimum information leakage is given by
Imine = min
Ui→Vi→Xi→Yi,Zi
σ2
Xi|ViYi
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi)− I(Vi; Yi|Ui) + I(Xi;Zi|Ui) (170)
as shown in Appendix C (in particular, see (161)). When we set U = φ, in other words,
when we set U1 = φ, . . . , UL = φ, (170) reduces to
Imin−φe = min
Vi→Xi→Yi,Zi
σ2
Xi|ViYi
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi)− I(Vi; Yi) + I(Xi;Zi) (171)
which is the desired result in (52).
Next, we prove (53) by using (170). When we set U = V , in other words, when we set
U1 = V1, . . . , UL = VL in (170), we get
Imine = min
Ui→Vi→Xi→Yi,Zi
σ2
Xi|ViYi
≤Di, i=1,...,L
L∑
i=1
I(Vi;Xi) + I(Xi;Zi|Vi) (172)
which is the desired result in (53).
E Proof of Lemma 2
We note that since X,Y are jointly Gaussian, we have [20, page 155]
KX|Y = KX −KXYK
−1
Y KY X (173)
= KX −KX(KX +ΣY )
−1KX (174)
= KX(KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY (175)
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where (174) comes from the fact that Y = X +NY . Next, we have the following chain of
equalities
|KX(KX +ΣY )
−1|
|F(D)(F(D) +ΣY )−1|
=
|KX(KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY |
|F(D)(F(D) +ΣY )−1ΣY |
(176)
=
|KX|Y |
|(ΣY (ΣY −D)−1ΣY −ΣY )Σ
−1
Y (ΣY −D)|
(177)
=
|KX|Y |
|D|
(178)
where (177) follows from the definition of F(D), i.e., F(D) = ΣY (ΣY − D)
−1ΣY − ΣY .
Equation (178) implies (72); completing the proof of Lemma 2.
F Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove the first statement of the lemma. To this end, using (175), we have
KX|Y = KX(KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY (179)
= ΣY −ΣY (KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY (180)
Hence, using (180), the constraint D  KX|Y can be expressed as
D  ΣY −ΣY (KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY (181)
which is
ΣY (KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY  ΣY −D (182)
where ΣY (KX +ΣY )
−1ΣY ≻ 0 implying ΣY −D ≻ 0. Hence, ΣY −D is non-singular, and
(ΣY −D)
−1 exists.
Next, we prove the second statement of the lemma. To this end, we note that since
(V,X,Y) are jointly Gaussian, Y = X+NY , and V is independent of NY , KX|V Y is given
by [20, page 155]
KX|V Y = KX − [ KXV KX ] M
−1 [ KXV KX ]
⊤ (183)
where M is given by
M =
[
KV KV X
KXV KY
]
(184)
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Using block matrix inversion lemma [21, page 45], M−1 can be obtained as
M−1 =
[
K−1V +K
−1
V KV X∆
−1
M KXVK
−1
V −K
−1
V KV X∆
−1
M
−∆−1M KXVK
−1
V ∆
−1
M
]
(185)
where ∆M is given by
∆M = KY −KXVK
−1
V KV X (186)
= KX −KXVK
−1
V KV X +ΣY (187)
= KX|V +ΣY (188)
where the last equality follows from the fact that KX|V = KX −KXVK
−1
V KV X . Using (185)
and (188), we get
[ KXV KX ] M
−1 =
[
ΣY∆
−1
MKXVK
−1
V I−ΣY∆
−1
M
]
(189)
using this in conjunction with (188), we obtain
[ KXV KX ] M
−1 [ KXV KX ]
⊤ = KX −ΣY +ΣY∆
−1
M ΣY (190)
Using (190) in (183), we have
KX|V Y = ΣY −ΣY∆
−1
M ΣY (191)
= ΣY −ΣY (KX|V +ΣY )
−1ΣY (192)
where (192) follows from (188). Thus, using (192), the constraint KX|V Y  D can be
expressed as follows
ΣY −ΣY (KX|V +ΣY )
−1ΣY  D (193)
from which, since ΣY −D ≻ 0, the following order can be obtained
KX|V  ΣY (ΣY −D)
−1ΣY −ΣY = F(D) (194)
which completes the proof of Lemma 3.
G Conditioning Reduces MMSE
Here, we prove that conditioning reduces MMSE. To this end, we introduce the following
lemma.
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Lemma 13 Let U and V be any two n-dimensional random vectors and g : Rn → Rn.
Then,
E
[
g(V)g⊤(V)|U = u
]
 E [g(V)|U = u]E
[
g⊤(V)|U = u
]
(195)
Proof: The proof of this lemma comes from the following fact
0  E
[
(g(V)− E [g(V)|U = u]) (g(V)− E [g(V)|U = u])⊤ |U = u
]
(196)
= E
[
g(V)g⊤(V)|U = u
]
− E [g(V)|U = u]E
[
g⊤(V)|U = u
]
(197)

We now prove the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE.
Lemma 14 If U → V → X, then KX|V  KX|U .
Proof: We have
KX|V = E
[
XX⊤
]
−E
[
E [X|V]E
[
X⊤|V
]]
(198)
= E
[
XX⊤
]
−E
[
E
[
E [X|V]E
[
X⊤|V
]
|U
]]
(199)
 E
[
XX⊤
]
− E
[
E [E [X|V] |U]E
[
E
[
X⊤|V
]
|U
]]
(200)
= E
[
XX⊤
]
−E
[
E [X|U]E
[
X⊤|U
]]
(201)
where (200) comes from Lemma 13 and (201) comes from the following fact
E [E [X|V] |U] = E [X|U] (202)
which is a consequence of the Markov chain U → V → X. 
H Proof of Lemma 4
We now prove Lemma 4. Since any jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) triple satisfying the Markov
chain U → V → X also satisfies KX|V  KX|U due to Lemma 14, the feasible set of L¯
G
already contains all jointly Gaussian (U, V ) pairs satisfying the Markov chain U → V → X.
Hence, we have LG ≥ L¯G. Next, we show that L¯G ≥ LG to complete the proof of Lemma 4.
To do so, we need to show that for any jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) with conditional covariance
matricesKX|U andKX|V satisfying 0  KX|V  KX|U  KX andKX|V  F(D), there exists
another jointly Gaussian (UG, V G) pair such that this pair has the following properties
• KX|V G = KX|V
• KX|UG = KX|U
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• UG → V G → X
To this end, we note that (UG, V G) can be represented as
V G = AVX+NV (203)
UG = AUX+NU (204)
where (NU ,NV ) and X are independent, NU ,NV are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors
with identity covariance matrices. The cross covariance of NU and NV is given by ΣUV =
E
[
NUN
⊤
V
]
, which needs to be selected accordingly to ensure that UG → V G → X.
The conditional covariance KX|V G is given by [20, page 155]
KX|V G = KX −KXV GK
−1
V G
KV GX (205)
Since we are seeking a V G such that KX|V G = KX|V , we set KX|V G = KX|V in (205) yielding
KX|V = KX −KXV GK
−1
V G
KV GX (206)
= KX −KXA
⊤
V (AVKXA
⊤
V + I)
−1AVKX (207)
which is equivalent to
K−1X (KX −KX|V )K
−1
X = A
⊤
V (AVKXA
⊤
V + I)
−1AV (208)
Next, we note the Woodbury matrix identity [22].
Lemma 15 ([22, page 17])
(
A+CBC⊤
)−1
= A−1 −A−1C
(
B−1 +C⊤A−1C
)−1
C⊤A−1 (209)
Using Woodbury matrix identity, we get
(
AVKXA
⊤
V + I
)−1
= I−AV (K
−1
X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1A⊤V (210)
using which in (208), we get
K−1X (KX −KX|V )K
−1
X = A
⊤
V
[
I−AV (K
−1
X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1A⊤V
]
AV (211)
= A⊤VAV −A
⊤
VAV (K
−1
X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1A⊤VAV (212)
= A⊤VAV −A
⊤
VAV (K
−1
X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1
(
K−1X +A
⊤
VAV −K
−1
X
)
(213)
= A⊤VAV (K
−1
X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1K−1X (214)
=
(
K−1X +A
⊤
VAV −K
−1
X
)
(K−1X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1K−1X (215)
= K−1X −K
−1
X (K
−1
X +A
⊤
VAV )
−1K−1X (216)
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which implies
KX|V =
(
K−1X +A
⊤
VAV
)−1
(217)
which, in turn, implies
A⊤VAV = K
−1
X|V −K
−1
X (218)
Hence, if we select AV as satisfying (218), we get KX|V G = KX|V . Similarly, if we select AU
to satisfy
A⊤UAU = K
−1
X|U −K
−1
X (219)
then, we also have KX|UG = KX|U .
Next, we will explicitly construct AV and AU matrices to satisfy (218) and (219), re-
spectively. To this end, we introduce the following lemma, which will be used subsequently.
Lemma 16 ([23]) Let A,B be two real symmetric positive semi-definite matrices. Then,
there exists a non-singular matrix W such that
A =W⊤ΛAW (220)
B =W⊤ΛBW (221)
(222)
where ΛA and ΛB are diagonal matrices.
Lemma 16 states that two real symmetric positive semi-definite matrices can be diagonalized
simultaneously. Using this fact in (218)-(219), we get
K−1X|V −K
−1
X =W
⊤Λ2VW (223)
K−1X|U −K
−1
X =W
⊤Λ2UW (224)
for some non-singular matrix W, and diagonal matrices ΛU ,ΛV . Since KX|V  KX|U , we
have K−1X|V  K
−1
X|U , which, in view of (223)-(224) imply
W⊤
(
Λ2V −Λ
2
U
)
W  0 (225)
Since W is non-singular, (225) implies that
ΛV  ΛU (226)
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Finally, we choose
AV = ΛVW (227)
AU = ΛUW (228)
which, in view of (218)-(219) and (223)-(224), imply KX|V G = KX|V and KX|UG = KX|U .
Next, we show that a proper selection the cross-covariance matrix ΣUV would yield the
desired Markov chain UG → V G → X. To this end, we introduce the following matrix
AUV = ΛUΛ
†
V (229)
where the diagonal matrix Λ†V is defined as follows:
Λ†V,ii =
{
1
ΛV,ii
, if ΛV,ii 6= 0
0, otherwise
(230)
Since ΛU  ΛV , we have ΛUΛ
†
VΛV = ΛU . Hence, we have
AUVAV = AU (231)
We also note the following
AUVA
⊤
UV = ΛU
(
Λ†V
)2
ΛU  I (232)
since ΛU  ΛV .
Now, we are ready to show that UG and V G satisfy the Markov chain UG → V G → X
by specifying ΣUV . We set NU as follows
NU = AUVNV + N˜ (233)
where N˜ is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix I−AUVA
⊤
UV , and
is independent of NV . In view of (233), we have
UG = AUX+NU (234)
= AUVAVX+AUVNV + N˜ (235)
= AUV V
G + N˜ (236)
which implies that (UG, V G) satisfy the Markov chain UG → V G → X; completing the proof.
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I Proof of Lemma 5
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem L¯G is given as follows
L
(
L¯G
)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣY |
|KX|V +ΣY |
+
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣZ|
|ΣZ |
− tr(M0KX|V )
− tr(MU (KX|U −KX|V ))− tr(MX(KX −KX|U))− tr(MD(F(D)−KX|V ))
(237)
where the positive semi-definite matricesM0,MU ,MD,MX are the Lagrange multipliers for
the following constraints
KX|V  0 (238)
KX|U −KX|V  0 (239)
F(D)−KX|V  0 (240)
KX −KX|U  0 (241)
respectively. Let K∗X|V and K
∗
X|U be the minimizers of the optimization problem L¯
G. Using
(237), the KKT conditions can be found as follows.
∇KX|V L(L¯
G) |KX|V=K∗X|V = 0 (242)
∇KX|UL(L¯
G) |KX|U=K∗X|U = 0 (243)
tr(M0K
∗
X|V ) = 0 (244)
tr(MU(K
∗
X|U −K
∗
X|V )) = 0 (245)
tr(MD(F(D)−K
∗
X|V )) = 0 (246)
tr(MX(KX −K
∗
X|U)) = 0 (247)
We first note that we have K∗X|V ≻ 0, otherwise L¯
G → ∞. Hence, using the fact that if
A  0,B  0, tr(AB) ≥ 0, and (244), we get M0 = 0. Next, using the fact that M0 = 0 in
(242), we get the KKT condition given in (83). Equation (243) implies (84). Finally, using
the fact that A  0,B  0, tr(AB) = tr(BA) ≥ 0 in (245)-(247), we can get the KKT
conditions given in (85)-(87), respectively.
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J Proof of Lemma 6
We start with the second statement of the lemma. To this end, we note that (84) and (88)
imply the following.
(K∗X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1 = (K∗X|U +ΣY )
−1 +MU (248)
= (K∗X|U +ΣZ)
−1 +MX (249)
Next, using the fact that if A ≻ 0,B ≻ 0 and A  B, we have A−1  B−1 in conjunction
with the fact thatMU  0,MX  0, we can obtain the second statement of the lemma from
(248)-(249).
Next, we consider the third statement of the lemma as follows
K∗X|V + Σ˜Y
= K∗X|V +
[
(K∗X|U +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
−K∗X|U (250)
= K∗X|V +
[
I+ (K∗X|U +ΣY )MU
]−1
(K∗X|U +ΣY )−K
∗
X|U (251)
= K∗X|V +
[
I+ (K∗X|U −K
∗
X|V +K
∗
X|V +ΣY )MU
]−1
(K∗X|U +ΣY )−K
∗
X|U (252)
= K∗X|V +
[
I+ (K∗X|V +ΣY )MU
]−1
(K∗X|U +ΣY )−K
∗
X|U (253)
= K∗X|V +
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1(K∗X|U +ΣY )−K
∗
X|U (254)
= K∗X|V +
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1(K∗X|U −K
∗
X|V +K
∗
X|V +ΣY )
−K∗X|U (255)
= K∗X|V +
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1(K∗X|U −K
∗
X|V )
+
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
−K∗X|U (256)
= K∗X|V +
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1 [
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]
(K∗X|U −K
∗
X|V )
+
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
−K∗X|U (257)
= K∗X|V + (K
∗
X|U −K
∗
X|V ) +
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
−K∗X|U (258)
=
[
(K∗X|V +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]−1
(259)
where (250) comes from (248), (253) and (257) follow from (85).
Now, we consider the fourth statement of the lemma as follows
(K∗X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1(K∗X|V + Σ˜Y ) = I+ (K
∗
X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1(K∗X|V −K
∗
X|U) (260)
= I+
[
(K∗X|U +ΣY )
−1 +MU
]
(K∗X|V −K
∗
X|U) (261)
= I+ (K∗X|U +ΣY )
−1(K∗X|V −K
∗
X|U) (262)
= (K∗X|U +ΣY )
−1(K∗X|V +ΣY ) (263)
where (261) follows from (248), and (262) comes from (85).
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Next, we consider the fifth statement of the lemma as follows
(K∗X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1(KX + Σ˜Y ) = I+ (K
∗
X|U + Σ˜Y )
−1(KX −K
∗
X|U) (264)
= I+
[
(K∗X|U +ΣZ)
−1 +MX
]
(KX −K
∗
X|U) (265)
= I+ (K∗X|U +ΣZ)
−1(KX −K
∗
X|U) (266)
= (K∗X|U +ΣZ)
−1(KX +ΣZ) (267)
where (265) comes from (249), and (266) is due to (87).
Now, we prove the last statement of the lemma. To this end, we note that the third
statement of this lemma and (83) imply the following
(K∗X|V + Σ˜Y )
−1 +MD = (K
∗
X|V )
−1 (268)
which will be used in the sequel. Now, the last statement of this lemma follows from
(K∗X|V + Σ˜Y )
−1(F(D) + Σ˜Y ) = I+ (K
∗
X|V + Σ˜Y )
−1(F(D)−K∗X|V ) (269)
= I+
[
(K∗X|V )
−1 −MD
]
(F(D)−K∗X|V ) (270)
= I+ (K∗X|V )
−1(F(D)−K∗X|V ) (271)
= (K∗X|V )
−1F(D) (272)
where (270) comes from (268), and (271) is due to (86).
Finally, we note that (268) also implies the first statement of the lemma; completing the
proof.
K Proof of Lemma 7
K.1 Background
We need some properties of the Fisher information and the differential entropy, which are
provided next.
Definition 1 ([24, Definition 3]) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated length-n random
vector pair with well-defined densities. The conditional Fisher information matrix of X given
U is defined as
J(X|U) = E
[
ρ(X|U)ρ(X|U)⊤
]
(273)
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where the expectation is over the joint density f(u,x), and the conditional score function
ρ(x|u) is
ρ(x|u) = ∇ log f(x|u) =
[
∂ log f(x|u)
∂x1
. . .
∂ log f(x|u)
∂xn
]⊤
(274)
We first present the conditional form of the Cramer-Rao inequality, which is proved
in [24].
Lemma 17 ([24, Lemma 13]) Let U,X be arbitrarily correlated random vectors with well-
defined densities. Let the conditional covariance matrix of X be Cov(X|U) ≻ 0, then we
have
J(X|U)  Cov(X|U)−1 (275)
which is satisfied with equality if (U,X) is jointly Gaussian with conditional covariance
matrix Cov(X|U).
The following lemma will be used in the upcoming proof. The unconditional version of
this lemma, i.e., the case T = φ, is proved in [24, Lemma 6].
Lemma 18 ([24, Lemma 6]) Let T,U,V1,V2 be random vectors such that (T,U) and
(V1,V2) are independent. Moreover, let V1,V2 be Gaussian random vectors with covariance
matrices Σ1,Σ2 such that 0 ≺ Σ1  Σ2. Then, we have
J−1(U+V2|T)−Σ2  J
−1(U+V1|T)−Σ1 (276)
The following lemma will also be used in the upcoming proof.
Lemma 19 ([24, Lemma 8]) Let K1,K2 be positive semi-definite matrices satisfying 0 
K1  K2, and f(K) be a matrix-valued function such that f(K)  0 for K1  K  K2.
Moreover, f(K) is assumed to be gradient of a scalar field. Then, we have
∫
K2
K1
f(K)dK ≥ 0 (277)
The following generalization of the de Bruijn identity [25,26] is due to [27], where the un-
conditional form of this identity, i.e., U = φ, is proved. Its generalization to this conditional
form for an arbitrary U is rather straightforward, and is given in [24, Lemma 16].
Lemma 20 ([24, Lemma 16]) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated random vector pair
with finite second order moments, and also be independent of the random vector N which is
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zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix ΣN ≻ 0. Then, we have
∇ΣNh(X+N|U) =
1
2
J(X+N|U) (278)
The following lemma provides a connection between the conditional covariance matrix
and the Fisher information matrices of a random vector.
Lemma 21 Let (V,X) be two arbitrary random vectors with finite second moments, and
N be a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix ΣN . Let Y = X +N.
Assume (V,X) and N are independent. We have
KX|V Y = ΣN −ΣNJ(X+N|V )ΣN (279)
Lemma 21 is proved in [27] for V = φ. Its generalization to the current conditional form can
be obtained by using the conditional Fisher information and Lemma 20.
K.2 Proof
We first consider the cost function of the optimization problem L¯
C(L¯) = I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜|U) + I(X;Z|U) (280)
= I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(U ; Y˜) + I(X;Z)− I(U ;Z) (281)
= I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(U ; Y˜,Z) + I(X;Z)− I(U ;Z) (282)
= I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(U ; Y˜|Z) + I(X;Z) (283)
≥ I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(X;Z) (284)
where (281)-(282) come from the following Markov chain
U → V → X→ Y˜ → Y,Z (285)
and (284) comes from the non-negativity of the mutual information. On the other hand,
(284) can be obtained from (91) by choosing U = φ, i.e., we have
L¯ ≤ min
V→X→Y˜→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(X;Z) (286)
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Hence, (284) and (286) imply the following
L¯ = min
V→X→Y˜→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(X;Z) (287)
= min
V→X→Y˜→Y,Z
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X|Y˜) + I(X;Z) (288)
where (288) comes from the Markov chain V → X → Y˜. We note that the optimization
problem in (288) is similar to the one we already studied in (67)-(71). Indeed, if the constraint
KX|V Y  D in (288) was KX|V Y˜  D, both optimization problems would be identical, and
using the analysis in (67)-(71), we could conclude that (288) is minimized by a Gaussian V
satisfying KX|V Y˜  D. However, the difference between these two constraints necessitates a
new proof, and indeed, showing the optimality of Gaussian V for the optimization problem in
(288) is not as straightforward as showing the optimality of Gaussian V for the optimization
problem in (67).
We find the minimizer for the optimization problem L¯ in two steps. In the first step, for
a given feasible V , we explicitly construct a feasible Gaussian V¯ which provides the same
value for the cost function of L¯ as the original V does. Thus, this first step implies that
restricting V to be Gaussian does not change the optimum value of the optimization problem
L¯. Consequently, in the second step of the proof, we minimize L¯ over all feasible Gaussian
V . To this end, we note that the cost function of the optimization problem L¯ can be written
as
C(L¯) = h(Y˜|V )− h(X|V ) + c (289)
for some constant c, which is independent of V . From now on, we focus on the difference of
the two differential entropy terms in (289). Next, we note that using Lemma 20, we have
h(Y˜|V )− h(X|V ) =
1
2
∫
Σ˜Y
0
J(X+N|V )dΣN (290)
whereN is zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrixΣN satisfying 0  ΣN .
Next, we find upper and lower bounds for (290). We note that Lemma 18 implies the following
upper bound for J(X+N|V )
J(X+N|V ) 
[
J−1(X|V ) +ΣN
]−1
(291)
Using (291) in (290) in conjunction with Lemma 19, we get
h(Y˜|V )− h(X|V ) ≤
1
2
log
|J−1(X|V ) + Σ˜Y |
|J−1(X|V )|
(292)
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We note that due to Lemma 17, we have J(X|V )  K−1X|V ≻ 0, i.e., (292) is well-defined.
Similarly, using Lemma 18, we have
J−1(X+ N˜Y |V )− Σ˜Y  J
−1(X+N|V )−ΣN , ΣN  Σ˜Y (293)
which implies
J(X+N|V ) 
[
J−1(X+ N˜Y |V )− Σ˜Y +ΣN
]−1
(294)
Using (294) in (290) in conjunction with Lemma 19, we get
h(Y˜|V )− h(X|V ) ≥
1
2
log
|J−1(X+ N˜Y |V )|
|J−1(X+ N˜Y |V )− Σ˜Y |
(295)
Now, we rewrite the bounds in (292) and (295). To this end, we define the following function
f(t) =
1
2
log
|K(t) + Σ˜Y |
|K(t)|
, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (296)
where the matrix K(t) is given as follows
K(t) = tJ−1(X|V ) + (1− t)
[
J−1(X+ N˜Y |V )− Σ˜Y
]
(297)
Hence, using f(t) in (296), the bounds in (292) and (295) can be rewritten as follows:
f(0) ≤ h(Y˜|V )− h(X|V ) ≤ f(1) (298)
Since f(t) is continuous in t, there exists t∗ such that
f(t∗) = h(Y˜|V )− h(X|V ) (299)
=
1
2
log
|K(t∗) + Σ˜Y |
|K(t∗)|
(300)
where K(t∗) is bounded as follows
J−1(X|V )  K(t∗)  J−1(X+ N˜Y |V )− Σ˜Y (301)
 J−1(X+NY |V )−ΣY (302)
where we used the fact that 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ 1 and Lemma 18. Thus, (300) implies that if we pick
a Gaussian V¯ satisfying KX|V¯ = K(t
∗), it provides the same value for the cost function of L¯
as the original V does.
Next, we check whether this Gaussian V¯ is feasible, i.e., whether it satisfies KX|V¯ Y  D.
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To this end, using Lemma 21, we get
KX|V¯ Y = ΣY −ΣY J(Y|V¯ )ΣY (303)
Since V¯ is Gaussian, Lemma 17 implies that
J(Y|V¯ ) = K−1
Y |V¯
(304)
= (KX|V¯ +ΣY )
−1 (305)
where (305) follows from the fact that (V¯ ,X) and NY are independent. Moreover, due to
(302), we have KX|V¯  J
−1(Y|V )−ΣY , which together with (305) imply the following
J(Y|V¯ )  J(Y|V ) (306)
Using (306) in (303), we get
KX|V¯ Y  ΣY −ΣY J(Y|V )ΣY (307)
= KX|V Y (308)
 D (309)
where (308) follows from Lemma 21 and (309) is due to the assumption that V is feasible,
i.e., KX|V Y  D. Equation (309) implies that the constructed Gaussian random vector V¯ is
feasible, i.e., for each feasible V , there exists a feasible Gaussian V¯ which provides the same
value for the cost function of L¯; completing the first step of the proof.
Hence, in view of this first step of the proof, we can restrict V to be Gaussian which
leads to the following form for L¯:
L¯ = min
V→X→Y˜→Y,Z
V is Gaussian
KX|V Y D
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(X;Z) (310)
= min
V→X→Y˜→Y,Z
V is Gaussian
KX|VF(D)
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y˜) + I(X;Z) (311)
= min
KX|V F(D)
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX + Σ˜Y |
|KX|V + Σ˜Y |
+
1
2
log
|KX +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(312)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|F(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX + Σ˜Y |
|F(D) + Σ˜Y |
+
1
2
log
|KX +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(313)
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where (311) follows from Lemma 3, and (313) comes from the fact that
|KX|V + Σ˜Y |
|KX|V |
(314)
is monotonically decreasing in the positive semi-definite matricesKX|V ; completing the proof
of Lemma 7.
L Proof of Lemma 8
We note that due to Theorem 3, we already have single-letter descriptions for the regions
Ro(D) and Rα(D). Thus, to prove Lemma 8, it suffices to show that for any given feasible
(U, V ), these two regions satisfy the relationship given in Lemma 8. We first note the
following Markov chains
U → V → X→ Y¯α → Y (315)
U → V → X→ Z¯α → Z (316)
Next, we show that any feasible (U, V ) for the region Ro(D) is also feasible for the region
limα→0Rα(D). To this end, we note that
D  KX|V Y (317)
 KX|V Y Y¯α (318)
= KX|V Y¯α (319)
where (318) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE and (319) follows from the
Markov chain in (315). Moreover, it can be shown that limα→0KX|V Y¯α exists and is equal
to KX|V Y . Hence, this observation and (319) imply that (U, V ) is also feasible for the region
limα→0Rα(D).
Next, we show that for a given (U, V ), any rate inside the region Ro(D) is also inside
limα→0Rα(D). To this end, for a given (U, V ), we denote the minimum achievable rates in
Ro(D) and Rα(D) by Ro and Rα, respectively. Due to Theorem 3, we have
Ro −Rα = [I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y)]− [I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y¯α)] (320)
= I(V ; Y¯α)− I(V ;Y) (321)
= I(V ; Y¯α|Y) (322)
≥ 0 (323)
where (322) comes from the Markov chain in (315). Equation (322) implies that any achiev-
able rate within the region Ro(D) is also included in the region limα→0Rα(D).
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Finally, we show that for a given (U, V ), any achievable information leakage inside the
region Ro(D) is also inside limα→0Rα(D). To this end, for a given (U, V ), we denote the
minimum information leakage in Ro(D) and Rα(D) by Ie,o and Ie,α, respectively. Due to
Theorem 3, we have
Ie,o − Ie,α = [I(V ;X)− I(V ;Y|U) + I(X;Z|U)]
−
[
I(V ;X)− I(V ; Y¯α|U) + I(X; Z¯α|U)
]
(324)
=
[
I(V ; Y¯α|U)− I(V ;Y|U)
]
+
[
I(X;Z|U)− I(X; Z¯α|U)
]
(325)
= I(V ; Y¯α|U,Y) +
[
I(X;Z|U)− I(X; Z¯α|U)
]
(326)
≥ I(X;Z|U)− I(X; Z¯α|U) (327)
≥ I(X;Z)− I(X; Z¯α) (328)
=
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| −
1
2
log
|KX +RZ(ΛZ + αI)
−2R⊤Z |
|RZ(ΛZ + αI)−2R
⊤
Z |
(329)
=
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| −
1
2
log
|KX +RZ(ΛZ + αI)
−1Q⊤ZQZ(ΛZ + αI)
−1R⊤Z |
|RZ(ΛZ + αI)−1Q⊤ZQZ(ΛZ + αI)
−1R⊤Z |
(330)
=
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| −
1
2
log |QZ(ΛZ + αI)R
⊤
ZKXRZ(ΛZ + αI)Q
⊤
Z + I|
(331)
where (326) comes from the Markov chain in (315) and (328) follows from the Markov chain
in (316). Equation (331) implies that
lim
α→0
Ie,o − Ie,α ≥
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| − lim
α→0
1
2
log |QZ(ΛZ + αI)R
⊤
ZKXRZ(ΛZ + αI)Q
⊤
Z + I|
(332)
=
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| −
1
2
log |QZΛZR
⊤
ZKXRZΛZQ
⊤
Z + I| (333)
=
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| −
1
2
log |HZKXH
⊤
Z + I| (334)
= 0 (335)
where (333) comes from the continuity of the determinant in positive semi-definite matrices.
Equation (335) implies that any achievable information leakage in the region Ro(D) is also
inside the region limα→0Rα(D); completing the proof of Lemma 8.
M Proof of Theorem 6
We start the proof of Theorem 6 by first expressing Theorem 4 for the side information model
given by (105)-(106). In other words, we first provide an outer bound for the region Rα(D)
by using Theorem 4. To this end, to be able to use Theorem 4, we needD  KX|Y¯α. However,
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since we originally have D  KX|Y and KX|Y¯α  KX|Y , where the latter one follows from
the Markov chain X→ Y¯α → Y and the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE, KX|Y¯α −D
might be indefinite. However, the only place we use the condition D  KX|Y is to be able to
show the equivalence between KX|V Y  D and KX|V  F(D) for Gaussian V in Lemma 3.
In particular, we only need the fact that ΣY −D is non-singular to show this equivalence,
and which is implied by D  KX|Y . However, still there might be distortion matrices D
for which although we have non-singular ΣY −D, the condition D  KX|Y is not satisfied.
Hence, if we can find an α∗ such that
ΣY,α −D ≻ 0, 0 < α ≤ α
∗ (336)
we can still use Theorem 4 to obtain an outer bound for the regionRα(D). Now, we establish
the existence of such an α∗. Using the assumption D  KX|Y , we have
D  KX|Y = (K
−1
X +H
⊤
YHY )
−1 (337)
where the equality follows from (217). Equation (337) implies that
0 ≺ D−1 −H⊤YHY (338)
= D−1 −RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y (339)
where we use the singular value decomposition ofHY . Thus, sinceD
−1−RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y is strictly
positive definite, there exists 0 < β such that
D−1 −RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y ≻ β
2I (340)
= β2RYR
⊤
Y (341)
which implies
D−1 ≻ RY (Λ
2
Y + β
2)R⊤Y (342)
which, in turn, implies the existence of an α∗ such that
D−1 ≻ RY (ΛY + α)
2R⊤Y , 0 < α ≤ α
∗ (343)
Hence, using the definition of ΣY,α in (343), we get
D−1 ≻ Σ−1Y,α, 0 < α ≤ α
∗ (344)
which is equivalent to the desired condition in (336) which is needed to use Theorem 4 to
obtain an outer bound for the region Rα(D). Hence, assuming that 0 < α ≤ α
∗, an outer
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bound for the region Rα(D) can be written as the union of rate and information leakage
(R, Ie) pairs satisfying
R ≥
1
2
log
|KX|Y¯α|
|D|
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|Fα(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX +ΣY,α|
|Fα(D) +ΣY,α|
(345)
Ie ≥ min
0KX|V KX|UKX
KX|V Fα(D)
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣY,α|
|KX|V +ΣY,α|
+
1
2
log
|KX|U +ΣZ,α|
|ΣZ,α|
(346)
where Fα(D) = ΣY,α(ΣY,α −D)
−1ΣY,α −ΣY,α. We now find the limiting region that comes
from the one described by (345)-(346) as α → 0. To this end,we introduce the following
lemma that will be used subsequently.
Lemma 22
lim
α→0
KX|Y¯α = KX|Y (347)
lim
α→0
Fα(D) = (D
−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1 (348)
The proof of Lemma 22 is given in Appendix N.
We first consider the rate bound in (345) as follows
lim
α→0
1
2
log
|KX|Y¯α|
|D|
=
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|D|
(349)
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which follows from the continuity of the determinant in positive semi-definite matrices and
(347). Similarly, for the second expression in the rate bound in (345), we have
lim
α→0
1
2
log
|KX |
|Fα(D)|
−
1
2
log
|KX +ΣY,α|
|Fα(D) +ΣY,α|
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
− lim
α→0
1
2
log
|KX +ΣY,α|
|Fα(D) +ΣY,α|
(350)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
− lim
α→0
1
2
log
|KX +RY (ΛY + αI)
−2R⊤Y |
|Fα(D) +RY (ΛY + αI)−2R
⊤
Y |
(351)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
− lim
α→0
1
2
log
|KX +RY (ΛY + αI)
−1Q⊤YQY (ΛY + αI)
−1R⊤Y |
|Fα(D) +RY (ΛY + αI)−1Q⊤YQY (ΛY + αI)
−1R⊤Y |
(352)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
− lim
α→0
1
2
log
|QY (ΛY + αI)R
⊤
YKXRY (ΛY + αI)Q
⊤
Y + I|
|QY (ΛY + αI)R⊤YFα(D)RY (ΛY + αI)Q
⊤
Y + I|
(353)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
−
1
2
log
|QYΛYR
⊤
YKXRYΛYQ
⊤
Y + I|
|QYΛYR⊤Y (D
−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1RYΛYQ⊤Y + I|
(354)
=
1
2
log
|KX |
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
−
1
2
log
|HYKXH
⊤
Y + I|
|HY (D−1 −H
⊤
YHY )
−1H⊤Y + I|
(355)
where (350) is due to the continuity of the determinant in positive semi-definite matrices
and (348), (351) comes from the definition of ΣY,α, (354) comes from the continuity of the
determinant in positive semi-definite matrices and (348), and (355) is obtained by using the
singular value decomposition of HY . Hence, (349) and (355) imply that any rate R inside
the region limα→0Rα(D) satisfies
R ≥
1
2
log
|KX|Y |
|D|
(356)
=
1
2
log
|KX|
|(D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1|
−
1
2
log
|HYKXH
⊤
Y + I|
|HY (D−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1H⊤Y + I|
(357)
Following a similar analysis, the limit of the information leakage in (346) can be found as
min
0KX|VKX|UKX
KX|V (D
−1−H⊤YHY )
−1
1
2
log
|KX |
|KX|V |
−
1
2
log
|HYKX|UH
⊤
Y + I|
|HYKX|VH
⊤
Y + I|
+
1
2
log |HYKX|UH
⊤
Y + I| (358)
which implies that any information leakage Ie inside the region limα→0Rα(D) should be
larger than (358); completing the proof of Theorem 6.
47
N Proof of Lemma 22
We first prove the following lemma which will be used subsequently.
Lemma 23 Let K(α) = (A+ f(α)B)−1, 0 < α ≤ α∗, where A ≻ f(α)B  0, 0 ≤ α ≤ α∗
and f(α) is continuous in α. Then, we have
lim
α→0
K(α) = (A+ f(0)B)−1 (359)
Proof: In the proof of this lemma, we use the fact that if limn→∞C
n = 0, we have
(I+C)−1 =
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nCn (360)
where C0 = I [21, page 19]. Now, we consider
K(α) = (A+ f(α)B)−1 (361)
= A−1/2(I+ f(α)A−1/2BA−1/2)−1A−1/2 (362)
where due to A ≻ f(α)B  0, we have I ≻ f(α)A−1/2BA−1/2  0 which implies
lim
n→∞
(
f(α)A−1/2BA−1/2
)n
= 0 (363)
Hence, we can use (360) in (362) to get
K(α) = A−1/2
[
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nfn(α)(A−1/2BA−1/2)n
]
A−1/2 (364)
which implies
lim
α→0
K(α) = lim
α→0
A−1/2
[
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nfn(α)(A−1/2BA−1/2)n
]
A−1/2 (365)
= A−1/2
[
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nfn(0)(A−1/2BA−1/2)n
]
A−1/2 (366)
= A−1/2
[
I+ f(0)A−1/2BA−1/2
]−1
A−1/2 (367)
= (A+ f(0)B)−1 (368)
where (367) comes from (360); completing the proof of Lemma 23. 
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We now consider (347) in Lemma 22 as follows
KX|Y¯α = KX(KX +ΣY,α)
−1ΣY,α (369)
= (K−1X +Σ
−1
Y,α)
−1 (370)
=
[
K−1X +RY (ΛY + αI)
2R⊤Y
]−1
(371)
=
[
K−1X +RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y +RY (2αΛY + α
2I)R⊤Y
]−1
(372)
where 0 < α ≤ α∗. Equation (369) comes from (175), (371) is due to the definition of ΣY,α.
We note that K−1X +RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y ≻ 0, and thus, α
∗ can be selected to ensure that
K−1X +RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y ≻ RY (2αΛY + α
2I)R⊤Y (373)
for all 0 ≤ α ≤ α∗. Hence, we can use Lemma 23 in (372) to get
lim
α→0
KX|Y¯α =
[
K−1X +RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y
]−1
(374)
=
[
K−1X +RYΛYQ
⊤
YQYΛYR
⊤
Y
]−1
(375)
= (K−1X +H
T
YHY )
−1 (376)
= KX|Y (377)
where (376) comes from the singular value decomposition of HY and (377) is due to (217);
completing the proof of (347).
Next, we consider (348) in Lemma 22 as follows
Fα(D) = ΣY,α(ΣY,α −D)
−1ΣY,α −ΣY,α (378)
= ΣY,α(ΣY,α −D)
−1D (379)
= (D−1 −Σ−1Y,α)
−1 (380)
= (D−1 −RY (ΛY + αI)
2R⊤Y )
−1 (381)
=
[
D−1 −RYΛ
2
YR
⊤
Y −RY (2αΛY + α
2I)R⊤Y
]−1
(382)
=
[
D−1 −RYΛYQ
⊤
YQYΛYR
⊤
Y −RY (2αΛY + α
2I)R⊤Y
]−1
(383)
=
[
D−1 −H⊤YHY −RY (2αΛY + α
2I)R⊤Y
]−1
(384)
where 0 < α ≤ α∗. Equation (381) comes from the definition of ΣY,α and (384) is obtained
by using the singular value decomposition of HY . We note that D
−1 − H⊤YHY is strictly
positive definite as (338) indicates, and hence, there exists an α∗ such that
D−1 −H⊤YHY ≻ RY (2αΛY + α
2I)R⊤Y (385)
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for all 0 ≤ α ≤ α∗. Consequently, we can use Lemma 23 in (384) to get
lim
α→0
Fα(D) = (D
−1 −H⊤YHY )
−1 (386)
which completes the proof of Lemma 22.
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